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IV. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN – A PRELIMINARY 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
Peter A.G. van Bergeijk
Introduction
This chapter seeks to contribute to the academic and policy debates on the merits of 
sanctions against Iran by providing an empirical analysis of their economic impact.1 
It starts by taking a look at stylised facts2 in order to establish whether sanctions 
are effective – measured by the degree to which they have constrained the Iranian 
authorities’ ability to sustain their ambitions in the nuclear field as a result of the 
costs sanctions have inflicted on the country. Having established the conditions 
under which sanctions meet the criteria for success (as developed in chapter I), the 
rest of the chapter explores the results of an econometric model that not only tracks 
the economic mechanisms through which sanctions operate, but also analyses their 
spillover effects in the political realm.
The Iranian case meets the economic requirements for success
The Iranian case would a priori seem to meet the underlying conditions under which 
sanctions should have a significant economic impact. Among them we can identify 
a sufficient level of pre-sanctions trade linkage between senders and the target coun-
try, combined with limited capabilities to substitute import and export products, 
as well as an unexpected broadening of the sanctions imposed and the use of a new 
tactic, namely the exclusion of Iran from the SWIFT worldwide messaging system. 
Trade sanctions
One of the most robust pre-conditions determining the degree to which sanctions 
have a significant economic impact is through the levels of pre-sanctions trade link-
ages. Figure 1 primarily shows that there was a significant level of pre-sanctions 
trade openness. Moreover, trade between Iran, the EU and the US covered some 
1. Editor’s note: This analysis is an ex ante assessment of the effects of sanctions on Iran and the likelihood of their 
success. It is based on economic modelling. The analysis, building and expanding on a paper co-authored with Sajjad 
Dizaji (2013), was undertaken before the July 2015 agreement between the E3+3 powers and Iran on the country’s 
nuclear programme. At the time of writing of this report in July 2015, it turns out that this model has proven highly 
predictive. The analysis offered in this chapter offers powerful insights into the dynamics of sanctions. 
2. This term, originally devised by the economist Nicholas Kaldor, refers to broad insights and deductions derived from 
empirical analysis of  the behaviour of a set of economic variables. 
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18% of Iran’s total export earnings. Between 2011 and 2013 (the 2013 numbers still 
being estimates), both trade ratios decreased by about four percentage points or a 
14-18 % decrease. This is in line with Iran’s 2010/11 export-to-GDP ratio of 21% and 
the share of the EU and US in Iran’s exports of 18% (these ratios in combination 
imply that trade at risk is 3.8% of Iran’s GDP). Figure 1 also shows the substantial 
decrease in Iranian overall trade, pointing to the possibility that sanctions may have 
contributed to this trade contraction. Given that exports are dominated by oil and 
that this specific product cannot be used as substitute for the import of capital 
goods, commodities and food, the effects of the imposed oil embargo are exacer-
bated. The reduction in oil export revenue as a result of the oil embargo spills over, 
first to the government budget and next to private consumption and investment.
Figure 1: Trade to GNP ratios for Iran (1995-2012 
and estimates and forecasts for 2013-2020)
Sources for data: GDP, exports and imports at constant 2000 prices and dollars for 1995-2007 are from World Bank, 
World DataBank, http://databank.worldbank.org  (accessed December 2012) and calculated from their real growth 
rates for 2008-13 as reported and estimated in IMF, April 2015 World Economic Outlook database (accessed May 
2015)
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Financial sanctions
The EU and US financial sanctions that accompanied the oil boycott may explain why 
the sanctions are biting much harder than expected – on the basis of pre-sanctions 
trade patterns. One of the measures taken within the EU’s financial sanctions 
package was to exclude Iran from the SWIFT worldwide messaging system, which 
is used to arrange international money transfers. This makes it significantly harder 
to process international payments, while simultaneously constraining other bilateral 
economic flows. Most importantly, the financial sanctions imposed are characterised 
by their unexpected scale (concretely through the involvement of the EU); while Iran’s 
exclusion from SWIFT is a measure that was used for the first time in history, and 
thus represents a new and innovative step. 
Economic dimension: key findings
· Pre-sanction trade linkage was substantial.
· Substitution possibilities between exported and imported products remain 
limited.
· Scale of the trade and investment sanctions was unexpected.
· SWIFT sanctions were unexpected.
These four key findings do not imply that the sanctions regime will succeed in 
achieving its stated goal – but rather that the expected likelihood of sanctions hav-
ing a significant economic impact is rather high. 
The political economy of sanctions
While the economic analysis suggests that sanctions are likely to have an important 
economic impact, we need to dig deeper into the knock-on effects brought about by 
restrictive measures from a political economy perspective.
Sanctions goals
First, it is important to note that the formally stated goal of the sanctions regime 
against Iran is to halt its nuclear programme, due to the suspicion that it is not be-
ing developed for peaceful purposes. As a result, it is important to check if the exist-
ing cases of sanctions regimes to enforce non-proliferation are statistically different 
from other sanctions regimes in general. After all, if it is more difficult to enforce 
non-proliferation, then we need to discount this in our assessment of the likelihood 
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that sanctions will succeed in constraining or prompting a behavioural change on 
the part of the target. 
The Peterson dataset lists 21 sanctions regimes that aim to change nuclear policies. 
Six cases are successful (28%): it should be noted that the median duration for suc-
cesses and failures are 1-4 years, respectively. Additional testing with a probability 
model that takes into account controlling factors such as trade linkage, duration, 
political stability and sender reputation, does not find a statistically significant dif-
ference for non-proliferation sanctions regimes [van Bergeijk, 2009]: the non-prolif-
eration cases can thus be analysed as if they were general sanction episodes.
Many commentators have linked sanctions to democratisation and in the Iran 
case perhaps this is an even more important goal for some of the current sender 
countries. Indeed, sanctions also appear to have been implemented with the hope 
of facilitating a democratic breakthrough in the target country. The implication is 
that the non-proliferation cases can be analysed and sanctions episodes aimed at 
strengthening democracy. This is yet another reason to focus our discussion below 
on the political changes in Iran.
Interest groups and regime change
The second issue to be noted is that we need to qualify the implicit assumption 
of a rational unitary actor – one that makes a cost-benefit analysis for society as a 
whole and acts accordingly. This is rather simplistic. The ‘public choice’ approach to 
economic sanctions in which interest group competition and political institutions 
are an important determinant of the impact of sanctions focuses attention on the 
extent to which sanctions hurt the supporters of the target government directly or 
compromise that government’s ability to reward supporters or, alternatively, sup-
press opposition. A body of empirical research shows a direct link between oil rev-
enue and government expenditure, especially regarding military spending.
The strength of the economy has been associated with the likelihood that the tar-
get’s leadership will survive. Typically growth slowdowns are associated with higher 
political turnover. Sanctions may either help to replace the target country’s govern-
ment or open up a bargaining range, making the target country’s leadership more 
willing to compromise due to the increasing political costs of not complying (i.e. a 
higher likelihood of government turnover). The key point is that the variations in 
economic wealth resulting from the imposition of sanctions matters empirically. 
Figure 2 takes a closer look at the evolution of this sanctions effect, bringing the 
growth and decline of GDP per capita as well as an index for democratisation into one 
picture. The simultaneous reduction of per capita income and the extent of democracy 
are remarkable, even if the causal relation could be deemed tentative at best. 
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Figure 2: Development of GDP per capita (growth rate) 
and Vanhanen index of democracy
Sources for data: IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2015) and Tatu Vanhanen, Measures of Democracy 
1810-2012 [computer file]. FSD1289, version 6.0 (2014-01-31). Tatu Vanhanen & Krister Lundell, [data collection]. 
Tampere: Finnish Social Science Data Archive [distributor], 2014.
From this we can infer that sanctions have adversely affected the middle class. The 
imposed sanctions created hardship and may have been one of the important mo-
tivating forces behind the 2013 democratic change of leadership that brought Rou-
hani to power. In our discussion we fortunately do not have to answer the question 
of whether the sanctions actually caused this shift. What matters is that sanctions 
have a better chance of succeeding in more democratic targets.
Political dimension: key findings
• The sanctions did not generate support for the existing regime (no rally 
around the flag effect).
• Very significant  increase in democracy index.
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Modelling economics and politics
In order to shed light on the causal mechanisms, a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model 
for Iran is used. A VAR model is based on the historical evolution of the data rather 
than on some preconceived theory and is able to capture the dynamics of an economy. 
Our model ably describes the history (1959-2006) of both key economic variables (oil 
and gas rents, government consumption, imports, gross capital formation, GDP) as 
well as political variables that either measure the autocracy-democracy dimension 
(the so-called Polity IV indicator) or the Vanhanen index, that measures political com-
petition and participation. We estimate the VAR model on the basis of annual data 
for the period 1959-2006. In this model a shock is introduced in the economic system 
that mimics the sanctions and thus offers a prediction of sanction outcome. 
Figure 3: Sanction impact on GDP, imports and investment in Iran
Source for data: Dizaji and van Bergeijk, 2013, Generalized impulse responses - statistical appendix appendix (internet 
resource available at : http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/50/6/721/suppl/DC1)
Economic variables
The blue lines represent the impulse response functions (first graph for GDP, second 
for imports and third for investment). The patterns of the economic impulse response 
functions are similar: a negative and initially large impact that becomes larger in size 
up to the third year after the sanction shock is administered and then becomes smaller 
as the economy adjusts.3
3. Note that the red lines report the confidence interval’s upper and lower bounds; the negative impact is thus only 
significant in the first three years - that is, until the upper bound crosses the horizontal axis.
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
55 
Political variables
Figure 4 reports the key findings for the variables of interest: the impact of sanctions 
on political outcomes in Iran. The left-hand panel in Figure 4 focuses on the impact 
of the sanctions on the extent of democratisation; a positive impact implies that the 
sanctions stimulate democracy. The right-hand side panel in Figure 4 reports on 
the Polity IV indicator that measures Iran’s location on the democracy-autocracy 
continuum. An increase in these two measures is associated with more democratic 
(less autocratic) outcomes. The two approaches show similar results, thus giving us 
some confidence in the robustness of the findings: an initially significant positive 
shock that turns negative after six to seven years. While the shift towards more de-
mocracy is reflected by the 2013 elections, it is too early to tell if the model’s predic-
tion of a turnaround in 2017-18 is on track.
Figure 4: Sanction impact on index of democracy and polity-IV
Source for data: Dizaji and van Bergeijk, 2013, Generalized impulse responses - statistical appendix (internet resource 
available at http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/50/6/721/suppl/DC1)
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Key findings
• The impact of an oil boycott on the Iranian economy is considerable: oil and 
gas rents are important drivers of key macroeconomic variables (GDP, imports 
and investments) and ultimately of its political system. 
• A reduction of oil and gas rents creates economic costs that act as incentives to 
move towards a more democratic setting. 
• In the first two years, sanctions have a significantly positive impact, but the 
VAR model predicts that this effect wanes and in the long run the political ef-
fect of sanctions is negative.
A final note on the phasing-out of sanctions
Adjustment of the economy does not only reduce the negative impact of sanctions. 
It also reduces the direct benefits of terminating the sanctions regime. This is a logi-
cal consequence emanating from a lowering of the economy’s dependence on inter-
national trade (more autarky). While this does not influence the long-run free trade 
benefits, the fact that the economy needs to re-adjust implies costs that should be dis-
counted properly. Again, the implication is that the sanctions can only help to soften 
the Iranian position in the short run. Long-term sanctions against Iran, in contrast, 
may run counter to the cost-inducing effects of the initial years of implementation.
Summary of key findings
• Theory and empirical evidence lead to the conclusion that the economic im-
pact of sanctions on the Iranian economy is considerable.  
• Sanctions create economic costs that act as incentives to move toward a more 
democratic system. 
• This effect is only significant in the first two years and turns negative after 6-7 
years due to economic adjustment. 
• Increasing global pressure will initially cause effective damage pushing for 
more democracy or less autocracy and thereby leading to a softening of the 
Iranian negotiation position.
• In the long run, sanctions, however, are likely to have the opposite effect. In 
this sense sanctions have created a window of opportunity, but it is impor-
tant to realise that this window is likely to close if  the sanctions regime is 
prolonged.
